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Undignified Bioethics 
 
For some bioethicists, ‘dignity’ is a useless concept.1  It has been claimed to be 
useless for at least three reasons.  First of all, some have accused dignity of being 
indeterminate.  These thinkers claim that dignity is used in so many opposing senses 
that the concept is just too slippery to help us tackle difficult problems in bioethics.2  
Second, others have accused dignity of being reactionary.  Proponents of this claim 
argue that dignity is unjustifiably invoked as a kind of moral trump to stall progressive 
advances in medicine and thus to impede the alleviation of great harms.3  Finally, still 
others have accused dignity of being redundant.  These thinkers claim that if any 
determinate and plausible meaning can be given to dignity, it sheds no new light on 
bioethical debates, and simply restates ideas that can be found in other ethical 
principles such as ‘respect for autonomy’.4
  Interestingly, however, a number of recent articles and books have mounted a 
defence of dignity.  These defences have claimed that dignity is so ingrained in 
bioethical discourse and legal instruments, that aiming to do away with it is simply, 
“…whistling in the wind.”5  As such, defenders of dignity argue that instead of purging 
the concept from bioethical debates, we should concentrate on clarifying the term, 
and making it more useful for addressing bioethical controversies.6
  This paper rejects these defences of dignity.  It acknowledges that coherent 
understandings of dignity can be found, but argues that they are all flawed.  As such, 
it argues that these conceptions of dignity should be rejected.  It claims that they 
should be rejected not simply because they are indeterminate, reactionary or 
redundant, but more fundamentally, because they rest on or invoke flawed ethical 
arguments.  Overall then, the paper argues for a bioethics without dignity: an 
‘undignified bioethics’. 
                                                 
1 R. Macklin. 2003. Dignity is a Useless Concept. British Medical Journal 2003; 327: 1419-1420. 
2 H. Kuhse. 2000. Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity? In Bioethics and Biolaw, Vol. 
II: Four Ethical Principles. P. Kemp, J. Rendtorff, & N. Mattson Johansen, eds., Copenhagen: Rhodos 
International Science and Art Publishers and Centre for Ethics and Law: 61-74.  
3 S. Pinker. 2008. The Stupidity of Dignity. The New Republic 28 May.    
4 Macklin, op. cit. note 1. 
5 D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword. 2001. Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 63; and D. Schroeder. Dignity: Two Riddles and Four Concepts. Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2008; 17: 230-238: 237. 
6 For attempts at clarification in this spirit see Beyleveld & Brownsword, op. cit. note 5; M. Hayry. 
Another Look at Dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004; 13: 7-14; L. Nordenfelt. 
The Varieties of Dignity. Health Care Analysis 2004; 12: 69-81; R.E. Ashcroft. Making Sense of 
Dignity. Journal of Medical Ethics 2005; 31: 679-682; Schroeder, op. cit. note 5; & R. Van Der Graaf 
& J.J.M. Van Delden. Clarifying Appeals to Dignity in Medical Ethics from an Historical Perspective. 
Bioethics 2009; 23: 151-160. 
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  In order to make this argument, the paper is divided into four sections, each of 
which considers a different conception of dignity.  Of course, the paper does not 
consider every possible conception of dignity.  Instead, the paper considers only 
those conceptions that are the most plausible and which are claimed to offer the 
most potential in helping us address bioethical controversies.  As such, the paper 
focuses on four different conceptions of dignity: dignity as virtuous behaviour; dignity 
as inherent moral worth; Kantian dignity; and dignity as species integrity.   In each 
section, the conception of dignity is explained, and is conceded to be coherent.  
Importantly, however, each section also argues that the particular conception of 
dignity should be rejected.   
 
Dignity as Virtuous Behaviour 
The first important conception of dignity that we need to consider understands dignity 
to be a form of virtuous behaviour.7  This behaviour-based conception of dignity is 
regularly invoked in bioethical discussions.  For example, it is often used to describe 
and praise those in the medical profession.  Doctors are sometimes said to act in a 
dignified manner when they conduct themselves in a composed and serious manner.  
Moreover, dignity is also used to describe and praise individuals when they show 
courage and self-control in the face of terrible illness and suffering.  Far from being 
slippery and useless then, it might be argued that conceiving of dignity as a form of 
virtuous behaviour offers a coherent understanding of the term which is helpful in 
tackling complex issues in bioethics. 
  However, if this conception of dignity is in fact to be useful, it is vital that we have a 
clear understanding of what behaviour counts as dignified.  From the literature, it 
seems that there are two interpretations of what constitutes dignified behaviour: one 
trivial and the other more noble. The trivial understanding sees dignified behaviour as 
acting in accordance, “…with society’s expectations of well-mannered demeanour 
and bearing.”8   Here then, to act in a dignified way is to act in accordance with the 
recognised norms and customs of one’s society: to cover one’s mouth when 
sneezing, to wait one’s turn when queuing, to refrain from swearing in front of 
children, and so on.  Of course, even if it is true that we should all aspire to conform 
to our society’s expectations of well-mannered behaviour, that alone tells us nothing 
about controversial issues in bioethics, such as the permissibility of stem cell 
                                                 
7 This understanding is identified by Nordenfelt, op. cit. note 6, p. 72; Schroeder, op. cit. note 5, p. 234; 
and Beyleveld & Brownsword, op. cit. note 5, p. 43. 
8 Schroeder, op. cit. note 5, p. 234. 
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research, cloning, genetic engineering and the like.  The trivial understanding of 
dignified behaviour does not appear to be of much use to bioethics.   
  In response, it might be argued that such rules over well-mannered behaviour do 
tell us something about how scientists and medical professionals should undertake 
their work.  Perhaps it is important that these individuals perform their tasks in a 
dignified way: in keeping with the recognised standards of demeanour of the society 
they work in.  Perhaps.  But even if such standards are easily identifiable, which is by 
no means obvious, we must ask ourselves just how important they are.  After all, 
some of us may prefer it if our medical professionals conform to certain behavioural 
norms when dealing with us, but it is unlikely that any of us actually consider such 
behaviour to be mandatory.  Surely the only behaviour of medical professionals that 
really matters is that which sees them doing everything in their power to minimise 
suffering, and to restore health where possible.  And it is obvious that medical 
professionals can act in this way even if they have certain habits and eccentricities 
which do not conform to ordinary societal norms.  As such, it would be extremely odd 
to demand that medical professionals and scientists act in accordance with this trivial 
understanding of dignified behaviour.               
  However, there is a more demanding, and perhaps more noble, understanding of 
dignified behaviour which also needs to be considered.  This interpretation sees as 
dignified that behaviour which shows self-control, and in particular self-control in the 
face of adversity.9  As such, it is often suggested that the lives of figures such as 
Socrates, Jesus and Nelson Mandela are all exemplars of dignified behaviour.  That 
is to say, even when these individuals faced extreme adversity and injustice in their 
lives, they did not lose self-control.  Instead, they maintained their moral principles 
even at high cost to themselves, and acted in a composed manner when most others 
would lash out.  This interpretation of dignity is relevant to bioethics in that it is often 
used to describe individuals living with serious disease and suffering.  For example, 
when the American actor Christopher Reeve was paralysed following a horse riding 
accident, and subsequently campaigned on behalf of those with spinal cord injuries, 
he was regularly described as acting with dignity.  This term was no doubt assigned 
to him on the basis that although he suffered terribly, and had lost so much of his 
physical capability, he did not wallow in self-pity, but instead maintained his self-
control, and steadfastly got on with the job of campaigning on behalf of others. 
  Clearly this interpretation of dignified behaviour is perfectly coherent.  However, 
once again, we must ask what kind of role it can usefully play in bioethics.  For even 
                                                 
9 Beyleveld & Brownsword, op. cit. note 5, p. 43; and Nordenfelt, op. cit. note 6, p. 72. 
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if we admit that there is something admirable about individuals behaving in such 
ways when they suffer so much, it is hard to see how the notion helps us address 
problems in bioethics such as abortion, euthanasia, organ transfers and the like.  In 
response, it might be claimed that it offers a form of behaviour that all those suffering 
from disease and illness should aspire to.  But is that really fair or reasonable?  It is 
surely too much to ask that we all live up to the standards set by such remarkable 
figures as Socrates, Jesus and Nelson Mandela! And indeed, why should we?  
Losing self-control in the face of adversity, whether it be wallowing in self-pity or 
ranting and raving uncontrollably at injustice, is surely a perfectly legitimate 
response.  More importantly, all of us surely recognise that it is a perfectly 
permissible reaction to adversity, provided that it harms no-one else.  Given all of 
this, it is hard to see why conceiving of dignity as virtuous behaviour is of any use to 
bioethics.   
 
Dignity as Inherent Moral Worth 
The second important conception of dignity that we need to consider does not see 
dignity as a form of behaviour, but as a property.  Under this conception, the 
possession of dignity by humans signifies that they have an inherent moral worth.10  
In other words, because human beings possess dignity we cannot do what we like to 
them, but instead have direct moral obligations towards them.  Indeed, this 
understanding of dignity is also usually considered to serve as the grounding for 
human rights.  As Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”11  
  In effect, this conception of dignity as moral worth is a universalised version of the 
more ancient understanding of the term.  Several authors have pointed out that the 
ancient understanding of dignity (or ‘dignitas’) was hierarchical.  That is to say, 
dignity was a moral worth reserved for those of extraordinary quality, who occupied 
the highest ranks and offices in society, and which individuals won as they climbed 
up the social hierarchy, and lost as they moved down.12  In more modern times, this 
extraordinary quality is said to be possessed by all human beings, irrespective of 
social rank.  It is also, of course, now said to be possessed by all human beings 
irrespective of race, religion, gender, age, nationality and so on.  In both cases, 
                                                 
10 This type of dignity is identified by Lennart Nordenfelt as ‘dignity of menschenwürde’ in Nordenfelt, 
op. cit. note 6, pp. 77-78. 
11 United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Reprinted in 2006. International 
Human Rights Documents. P. R. Ghandi, ed., 5th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 21-25.  
12 See Hayry, op. cit. note 6, p. 11; Nordenfelt, op. cit. note 6, pp. 71-72; Van Der Graaf & Van Delden, 
op. cit. note 6, p. 154; and Schroeder, op. cit. note 5, p. 233. 
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however, dignity refers to a property possessed by human beings which makes them 
deserving of certain treatment.  By seeing this quality as possessed by every single 
human being, the modern understanding of dignity simply makes noblemen of us all. 
  This conception of dignity as inherent moral worth certainly seems coherent enough 
as an idea.  Indeed, we can also see why this conception of dignity is employed in 
certain debates around bioethics.  For if all individual human beings possess dignity, 
then they should not be viewed simply as resources that we can treat however we 
please.  To take an example then, it may be that we could achieve rapid and 
significant progress in medical science if we were to conduct wide-ranging medical 
experiments on groups of human beings.  However, because human beings have 
dignity, so it is argued, this means that they possess a particular quality which 
grounds certain moral obligations and rights.  These obligations and rights restrict 
what we may permissibly do to them.  As such, inflicting great harms on individual 
humans, as would be inflicted in medical experiments, is impermissible on the 
grounds that human individuals possess dignity.  The dignity of individual human 
beings prevents us from doing certain acts to them, even if those acts would lead to 
great social benefits.   
  But while this conception of dignity does indeed make sense, there is a huge 
problem with it.  It remains extremely unclear where dignity comes from.  For 
instance, Article 1 of the UDHR simply stipulates that, “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity...”  But why are they?  If all human beings possess dignity - 
this extraordinary moral worth – we need some explanation of what it is about the 
species Homo sapiens that makes them so deserving.  When we start looking at 
particular characteristics that might ground dignity - language-use, moral action, 
sociality, sentience, self-consciousness, and so on – we soon see that none of these 
qualities are in fact possessed by each and every human.  We are therefore left 
wondering why all human beings actually do possess dignity. 
  Moreover, the crucial point about conceiving of dignity as signifying our inherent 
moral worth is surely that it does not depend on the qualities of individuals.  Rather, 
dignity is simply ingrained in every member of the human species.  As such, if there 
is to be any justification of the idea that all and only human beings possess this 
inherent moral worth, it must then be that humans are special in a sense which 
transcends their physical characteristics.  And indeed, this is where religion - and in 
particular the Christian religion - fills the explanatory gap.  For the Christian religion 
tells us that humans are indeed special in some non-physical sense: they alone are 
made in the image of God, and they alone are in possession of a soul.  If we buy into 
these ideas, the idea of dignity as inherent moral worth suddenly starts to make a lot 
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more sense.  All and only humans possess dignity because all and only humans are 
in this special relationship with God.13  
  But while this conception of dignity now makes sense, it only does so by being 
grounded in extremely controversial claims that not all individuals can reasonably be 
expected to accept.  The problem is not so much that it is obviously wrong that 
humans are made in the image of God; but rather, that in modern pluralistic societies, 
many people have quite different religious beliefs, or even none at all.14  Using this 
understanding of dignity to make policy decisions over controversial issues in 
bioethics thus seems to privilege one type of religious viewpoint without reasonable 
justification. 
  Furthermore, even if we were to accept the conception of dignity as a property of all 
human beings signifying their inherent moral worth, it still does not help us get very 
far in tackling controversies in bioethics.  The dignity of human beings tells us that 
individuals have a moral worth and thus that we have certain important obligations 
towards them.  But which obligations?  For example, is assisting those who are 
terminally ill, suffering terribly and who have asked for help in ending their lives 
permissible or impermissible?  The conception of dignity as the inherent moral worth 
of human beings tells us nothing.  It may be, as some conservatives argue, that the 
moral worth of human beings means that we can never take the life of another 
individual.  But it may also be, as some liberals argue, that the moral worth of human 
beings demands that we take individuals’ informed choices extremely seriously.15  
On its own, conceiving of dignity as the inherent moral worth of all human beings 
offers nothing to help us resolve such difficult problems. 
  I believe then that we should reject the conception of dignity as a property 
possessed by all human beings signifying their inherent moral worth.  Obviously, 
given controversies over abortion, stem cell research, genetic interventions, animal 
experimentation, euthanasia and so on, bioethics does need to engage in debates 
over which entities possess moral worth and why.  But these are best conducted by 
using the notion of ‘moral status’ and arguing over the characteristics that warrant 
possession of it.16  Simply stipulating that all and only human beings possess this 
inherent moral worth because they have dignity is arbitrary and unhelpful.   
 
                                                 
13 For an understanding of dignity along these lines see, L. R. Kass. 2002. Life, Liberty and the Defense 
of Dignity. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books: 241-243.  
14 Beyleveld & Brownsword, op. cit. note 5, p. 45. 
15 Hence we see dignity invoked by both sides in debates over euthanasia. 
16 See M. A. Warren. 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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Kantian Dignity  
The third important conception of dignity that must be considered is Kantian.17  This 
conception of dignity also sees dignity as a property, but it differs from the inherent 
moral worth conception in two ways.  First of all, a strict interpretation of it implies 
that it is not necessarily inherent in all (or only) human beings.  Only those entities 
with the capacities for personhood possess dignity under the Kantian interpretation.  
The second difference with this conception of dignity is that while it does 
acknowledge that those with dignity possess a moral worth, and are thus owed 
certain forms of treatment, it also tells us what kinds of treatment possessors of 
dignity are owed.   
  We can see then that the Kantian conception of dignity remedies two of the 
problems with the inherent moral worth interpretation.  Kantian dignity does not 
arbitrarily assign moral status to all and only human beings.  Nor does it make moral 
worth dependent on controversial faith-based premises that not all can accept.  
Instead, the Kantian conception sees the capacities of personhood as determining 
moral status.  The capacities of personhood are moral agency and autonomy.  Moral 
agency is the ability to reason about and act upon moral principles. Autonomy is the 
capacity to self-determine: to frame, revise and pursue a conception of the good.  
From this, it is evident that not all human beings are endowed with dignity from birth, 
as stipulated in the UDHR.  Nor is it necessarily true that only members of the 
species Homo sapiens possess this moral worth.  As such, Kantian dignity provides a 
plausible and determinate means of assigning moral status in bioethical discussions.     
  Furthermore, and unlike the inherent moral worth conception, Kantian dignity also 
gives us some guidance as to what obligations we owe to those with dignity.  For 
under the Kantian conception, those entities with dignity are ends-in-themselves: 
self-determining entities who can exercise moral judgement and free will.  Because 
they are ends-in-themselves, Kant argued that possessors of dignity should always 
be treated as an end-in-themselves, and never solely as a means.  This ‘ends-in-
themselves’ formula has been applied directly to various bioethical questions.  But it 
has also been used more loosely in order to ground the principle of respect for 
autonomy.  Clearly then, Kantian dignity offers a coherent conception of the term and 
is potentially a very useful tool to help us address complex problems in bioethics.   
  Despite the advantages of Kantian dignity over the inherent moral worth conception, 
I maintain that it too should be rejected.  First of all, using Kantian dignity as a means 
to assign moral status to entities is overly exclusive.  If only ‘persons’ – those with the 
                                                 
17 This conception is identified in Hayry, op. cit. note 6, p. 9; Van Der Graaf & Van Delden, op. cit. 
note 6, p. 157; Schroeder, op. cit. note 5, p. 233; and Beyleveld & Brownsword, op. cit. note 5, p. 11.  
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capacities for moral agency and autonomy – possess moral status, then a huge 
range of individuals are left out of the moral community.  For example, young infants, 
the severely mentally disabled and the vast majority of species of non-human animal 
all lack the ability to make moral choices and formulate conceptions of the good.  But 
even though these individuals lack such capacities, surely there are limits to what we 
can permissibly do to them. 
  In response, proponents of Kantian dignity might draw a distinction between direct 
and indirect obligations.18  They would point out that denying moral status to non-
persons does not mean we can do what we like to them.  We may have no direct 
obligations to such individuals, so the argument goes, but we do have indirect 
obligations in respect of them.  For example, they might argue that we should not 
steal from the severely mentally disabled not because we owe anything to them 
directly, but because we owe something to their friends, family and society, or even 
because stealing from them might lead us to commit further crimes against others. 
  However, most of us will quite rightly consider this response to be entirely wrong.  
For our obligation not to steal from the mentally disabled – just like our obligation to 
feed infants and not to beat dogs – is surely and uncontroversially something owed 
directly to these individuals themselves.  True, these individuals may not be persons 
in the Kantian sense, but they do have interests which can be set back or promoted.  
And it is the possession of these interests which alone seems sufficient to warrant 
recognition of moral status.19  As such, we should reject using Kantian dignity as a 
means of assigning moral status to entities. 
  Secondly, we should also question the ethical principles which are said to derive 
from the Kantian conception of dignity.  You will recall that Kantian dignity not only 
assigns to its possessors a moral worth, it also tells us that we cannot treat its 
possessors solely as a means.  But what precisely does it involve to treat an 
individual solely as a means?  To help explain, consider the case of so-called 
‘saviour siblings’, where parents conceive a child specifically in order to help an older 
brother or sister, say by providing stem cells for transplantation.  Some have argued 
against the creation of such children by invoking Kant’s formula.20  They claim that 
                                                 
18 See Kant’s discussion of our obligations regarding animals on this distinction.  I. Kant. 1963. 
Lectures on Ethics. L. Infield trans. New York: Harper and Row: 239. 
19 The notion that the possession of interests is the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession 
of moral status has been famously advanced by utilitarian thinkers such a Jeremy Bentham and Henry 
Sidgwick.  See also P. Singer. 1995. Animal Liberation. 2nd edition. London: Pimlico: 7-8. 
20 See for example the exchange between Axel Kahn and John Harris with regards to the creation of 
such individuals through cloning as described in J. Harris. 2004. On Cloning. London: Routledge: 38-
42.  I very much agree with Harris’s position. 
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creating children in this way is to use them solely for the benefit of others, and thus 
solely as a means, which is impermissible under the ends-in-themselves principle.  
  But we should remember that Kant’s formula does not rule out using individuals as 
a means per se, but rules out using them solely as a means.  After all, we use people 
as a means to our ends quite permissibly and quite uncontroversially all the time, 
such as using plumbers to fix our leaky radiators.  Using peoples as a means only 
becomes impermissible when we treat them solely as a means: say, for example, if I 
keep the plumber locked up in my shed so that he is available to fix my radiators at 
my whim.  We can see then that treating people solely as means is a fairly extreme 
form of behaviour.  Indeed, returning to saviour siblings, we have to question whether 
the parents of saviour siblings really are using those individuals solely as a means.  
In the overwhelming majority of real-life cases, that seems not to be the case.  The 
individuals are created and used in order to benefit the older sibling, but they 
themselves are also loved, respected and cared for as an equal member of the 
family.  Certainly, saviour siblings are treated as means, but they are also respected 
and treated as individuals with ends of their own. 
  Of course, it is certainly possible that a family could treat a saviour sibling 
exclusively as a means: for example, perhaps a family could regard the saviour 
sibling simply as an organ bank, and so kill them at some point so that all their 
organs are available for transplantation.  That does seem obviously wrong; and it 
does seem to be a case where individuals are treated exclusively as a means.  In 
effect, it is much like my enslavement of the plumber, where the individual is treated 
as a mere thing that exists purely for my own ends.  But do we really need the 
Kantian notion of dignity to tell us that slaughtering innocent children for their organs 
is wrong?  Surely the wrong of slaughtering children is straightforwardly identified in 
the fact that the children’s own interests in continued life are set back, and not in the 
fact that they are treated exclusively as means.  And surely the wrong of enslaving a 
plumber derives from the fact that a great many of the plumber’s most basic interests 
are set back, and not from any notion that he is being treated exclusively as a 
means. 
  In light of all this, I believe that we should be much more suspicious of the end-in-
themselves principle which derives from the Kantian conception of dignity.  First of 
all, the practical use of the principle can be questioned, given that we only ever treat 
other individuals exclusively as means in very extreme cases.  Secondly, while in 
those extreme cases, like killing innocents for their organs and slavery, there is 
obvious moral wrong, that moral wrong does not seem to rest on the fact that those 
 9
individuals are being treated exclusively as means.  Rather, it simply seems to rest 
on the fact that their most important interests are set back in an improper way. 
  But while a strict use of the end-in-themselves principle might be unhelpful, perhaps 
a looser use of it could be of more benefit.   For, as I pointed out above, the Kantian 
understanding of dignity has been used to ground the principle of respect for 
autonomy: that the autonomous choices of individual persons should be respected as 
far as possible.  After all, according to the Kantian conception, dignity belongs to 
those who are persons.  Furthermore, part of being a person involves the capacity for 
autonomy: the ability to self-determine.  Given the importance of self-determination to 
dignity, we can justifiably surmise that being treated with dignity involves having 
one’s autonomous capacities respected.  Importantly, this principle of respect for 
autonomy holds an important place in bioethics, often being invoked in debates over 
abortion, sexual reproduction, euthanasia, informed consent, and so on.21  As such, 
it may well be that the Kantian conception of dignity does offer a plausible and useful 
tool for helping to resolve tricky questions in bioethics. 
  However, the Kantian conception of dignity is not necessary to ground the principle 
of respect for autonomy.  To ground such a principle, all we need to say is that most 
human beings have a strong interest in having their autonomous choices respected.  
There is simply no need to ground the principle of respect for autonomy in any notion 
of dignity whatsoever.  In fact, basing respect for autonomy in ‘dignity’ is actually 
unhelpful.  Because dignity is also used by some to assign moral status – and thus to 
be the very basis of our moral obligations - stating that our autonomy should be 
respected because we possess dignity implies that autonomy is of ultimate 
importance.  But first of all, we would be wise to remember that our interest in 
autonomy is just one of our interests, and it does need to be balanced against other 
goods that are of value to us.  Pleasure, community, physical health and so on, are 
all other important interests that must not automatically be subsumed in the name of 
autonomy.  Furthermore, we must remember that not all individuals of moral worth 
even possess autonomous capacities.  There are some individuals for whom the 
principle of respect for autonomy has no relevance.  For example, it is of no good to 
newborn babies to have their informed choices respected.  So while respecting the 
autonomous choices of individual persons is often a laudable goal, there are good 
reasons to keep that principle separated from conceptions of dignity. 
   
Dignity as Species Integrity  
                                                 
21 Respect for autonomy is one of the four principles advocated in T.L. Beauchamp & J. F. Childress.  
2001.  Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 5th edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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The final conception of dignity understands dignity not as a form of behaviour, nor as 
a property, but as a form of flourishing life, or ‘dignified existence’.22  Indeed, Martha 
C. Nussbaum claims that in order to lead a dignified existence one must be able to 
flourish as the kind of being that one is.23  As such, to lead a life of dignity is to lead a 
life where one is capable of performing the central valuable functionings of one’s 
species.    In many cases then, this dignity is a kind of self-respect that can be lost 
when we suffer certain forms of ‘dehumanising’ treatment.24  For example, it is 
regularly said that individuals suffer from a loss of dignity when they are tortured or 
treated in other ways not fit for human beings.  Such treatment might involve being 
tied up, forced to eat like an animal, made to display one’s naked body, and so on 
and so forth.  In all cases, such treatment is considered to treat individuals without 
dignity, because it deprives them of certain valuable human functionings. 
  Of course, such a conception of dignity is familiar in bioethics.  For example, elder 
abuse has recently become an important issue in the UK and elsewhere.  Acts which 
dehumanise those in care, such as leaving individuals in soiled clothing and 
bedclothes, overmedicating individuals in order to sedate them, failing to provide 
assistance at mealtimes, and so on, have all been said to diminish the dignity of their 
elderly victims.  Furthermore, individuals who have lost certain central human 
capacities through illness or disability sometimes themselves claim to have suffered 
from a loss of dignity. This was clearly the case for Daniel James, a 23 year old 
Briton who suffered paralysis in a rugby training accident in 2007.  After several 
unsuccessful attempts at committing suicide, James died at the Dignitas clinic in 
Switzerland in 2008.  His parents said that because of his loss of functioning, James 
felt that he led a second-class life, filled with terror, discomfort and indignity.25   
  However, proponents of this conception of dignity do not claim that it centres solely 
on a subjective feeling of loss.  In fact, they claim that a large part of its normative 
power derives from the fact that it rests on something more than subjective well-
being.26  The claim is that a dignified existence depends on the possession of certain 
key species functionings, irrespective of whether one feels happier for having them.  
                                                 
22 This is the conception least discussed by defenders of dignity.  I find this odd, as it seems the most 
potentially useful to my mind.  Nordenfelt’s notion of ‘dignity of identity’ is closely related, however.  
See Nordenfelt, op. cit. note 6. pp. 76-76. 
23 M.C. Nussbaum. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: 162. 
24 The importance of self-respect to dignity is highlighted in P. Balzer; K. Rippe; and P. Schaber. Two 
Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering. 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 2000; 13: 7-27. 
25 D. Foggo. 2008. Why Daniel James chose to die. The Sunday Times 19 October. 
26 Nordenfelt, op. cit. note 6, p. 76; and M. Marmot. Dignity and Inequality.  The Lancet 2004; 364: 
1019-1021. 
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Because of this, they are able to say that those in comas lack a dignified existence, 
that the dead can be treated without dignity, and that the deliberate creation of 
individuals with disabilities undermines their dignity.  In all such cases, there is no 
diminution of subjective well-being, but it is claimed that the loss of species integrity 
signals something morally problematic.     
  But in order for this conception of dignity to be plausible, we need some means of 
determining what it means to flourish as a member of one’s species.  It cannot be the 
case that a dignified life can simply be equated with all of the natural functionings of 
human beings.  After all, some natural human acts are morally bad, such as rape and 
murder; while others are morally neutral, such as our growing of hair and fingernails.  
As such, a dignified human life can surely not be equated with strict species integrity.  
In order to address such problems, Nussbaum claims that while the capabilities 
which amount to a dignified life are informed by the ‘characteristic activities’ of the 
species, not all human activities are included.  Instead, the list is ethical and 
evaluative.27  This of course makes sense.  But given that we are now being asked to 
make ethical and evaluative judgements about which capabilities amount to a 
dignified existence, one wonders how much work the notion of species integrity is 
actually doing.  Why not just list those goods that are of value to individuals, without 
reference to any notion of species? 
  Nussbaum’s answer is that species norms are crucial in determining what counts as 
a flourishing life.  To explain, she asks us to consider a child with severe mental 
impairments and a chimpanzee with normal mental faculties.  Nussbaum tells us that 
although their mental capacities are in fact extremely similar, the two individuals have 
very different possibilities for a flourishing and dignified life.28  She argues that 
because he is close to his species norm, the chimpanzee has excellent opportunities 
for a flourishing life, but because the child falls well below her species norm, she 
does not.  On this view, species norms set the possibilities for a dignified life. 
  Of course, this explanation does seem to chime with many people’s intuitions.  
Many do seem to use ‘normal species capacities’ as a kind of measuring stick for a 
flourishing life.  Those that are born without certain key species functions, or lose 
them over the course of their lives, are considered by many to be worse off simply for 
that fact, no matter how high their subjective well-being.  These intuitions are in 
keeping with Nussbaum’s argument that there is a threshold of species functionings 
below which, “…a decently dignified life for citizens is not available.”29  But perhaps 
                                                 
27 Nussbaum, op. cit. note 22, p. 180. 
28 Ibid: 363. 
29 Ibid: 179. 
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Nussbaum and those with these intuitions are wrong on this point.  Perhaps this is 
the wrong attitude to disability.  After all, many disability campaigners would reject 
the claim that they are unfortunate to the extent that they fall ‘below’ the normal 
species threshold, and would find feelings of pity directed towards them patronising.  
They would point out that their functionings are simply different to the species norm, 
and that they are perfectly capable of leading decent lives, not by being brought into 
conformity with the functionings of the species norm, but by living in societal 
conditions that allow them to flourish as the individuals they are.  In this way, they 
would claim that equating a flourishing life with the notion of species integrity 
mistakenly adopts a perfectionist understanding of what counts as a decent human 
life, and has the serious potential to stigmatise those with disabilities. 
  But while this charge of perfectionism certainly carries some weight, we should not 
completely ignore the serious suffering and impediments to well-being that disabilities 
can cause.  For it is surely implausible to say that those with the most debilitating 
forms of disability are not at all unfortunate, and can always lead lives that are as 
flourishing as any other individual.  But if that is so, how are we to base judgements 
of a flourishing life?  I believe that we can do so not by any reference to dignity, but 
by reference to opportunities for well-being. This avoids the perfectionism of the 
species integrity approach, recognises the serious obstacles to flourishing that 
disabilities can create, and also takes into account the important role that societal 
conditions have in affecting opportunities for flourishing. 
 To illustrate, consider an individual who lacks some valuable human functioning.  
According to the species integrity approach, that individual lacks the possibility for a 
fully flourishing life on that basis alone.  The opportunities for well-being approach, 
however, is more subtle.  Firstly, it asks what the nature of the disability is.  Some 
disabilities, such as permanent vegetation, may be so debilitating that they afford 
very few or even no opportunities for well-being.  For individuals suffering in these 
ways, a fully flourishing life is clearly not available.  As well as the nature of the 
disability, the approach also considers the level of societal provision.  For example, 
lacking something like the ability to walk seems like it would obviously result in that 
person possessing fewer opportunities for well-being.  And yet, the opportunities that 
the ability to walk affords, such as freedom of movement, participation in sport, and 
so on, can also be provided to those in wheelchairs, given proper investment.  In 
other words, those in wheelchairs can certainly lead fully flourishing lives given the 
right social conditions.  What seems crucial for a flourishing life then is not that 
individuals possess the normal functionings of their species, but that they have 
adequate opportunities for well-being.  Whether such opportunities are available will 
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be determined in part by the nature of the disability and in part by the societal 
provisions that are in place. 
  The important point from all this is that we should reject making judgements of a 
flourishing life on the possession of normal species functionings.  We can make more 
plausible judgements on the simple basis of opportunities for well-being, and without 
any reference to dignity or species integrity whatsoever.  As such, I claim that the 
conception of dignity as species integrity should also be rejected. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to give dignity the benefit of the doubt.  I have surveyed 
what I consider to be the best and most plausible conceptions of dignity, and have 
rejected them all.  Dignity as virtuous behaviour should be rejected on the grounds 
that it is either trivial or overly demanding.  Dignity as the inherent moral worth of all 
human beings should be rejected on the grounds that is arbitrary and rests on 
controversial premises.  Kantian dignity should be rejected on the grounds that it 
excludes too many from the moral community and is unhelpful in delineating our 
moral obligations.  Dignity as species integrity should be rejected on the grounds that 
it wrongly associates a flourishing life with the possession of normal species 
functionings.  Given that these are the best conceptions of dignity available, and that 
all are flawed, it would be preferable to purge dignity from bioethics.  However, and 
as mentioned above, several scholars have pointed out that the term is deeply 
ingrained in bioethical debate, so attempting to do away with it is equivalent to 
‘whistling in the wind’.30  I disagree.  Just because an ethical term is popular does not 
mean that we are under an obligation to keep it.  Trends in ethical discourse change, 
and scholars can affect that change, even if only minimally.  If concepts are unclear, 
it is the job of scholars to push that they be clarified.  Moreover, if concepts are 
flawed and unhelpful, it is the job of scholars to push that they be rejected.  In the 
case of dignity in bioethical discourse, I take the latter view.  As such, I urge for an 
undignified bioethics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 See note 5. 
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